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This paper is public policy analysis that looks into the design and history of the French 
Zone d’Éducation Prioritaire (ZEP) program in order to understand why policymakers revived 
the program in the wake of 2006 mass youth riots. The ZEP policy espoused principles of 
positive discrimination, or affirmative action, in French primary and secondary schools. First 
enacted under socialist president François Mitterand, the ZEP policy changed both the nature and 
purpose of French education. Previously, France’s education system had been one for the elite, 
its policies designed to provide academic studies to a few and vocational training to the rest. In 
the early 1980s, however, Mitterand’s government implemented a policy known as the Zone 
d’Education Prioritaire policy, thereby providing extra funding, resources, and specific services 
to students in low-income areas. A program that exists to this day, the ZEP policy created a form 
of positive discrimination that politicians hoped would lead to greater equity among French 
students in secondary schools and beyond. My paper examines why and how policymakers have 
maintained this hope, relying on ZEPs as a reform to improve conditions in suburban public 
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On the evening of October 27, 2005, Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna headed home for a 
Ramadan meal. The fifteen and seventeen-year-old boys had just finished a pickup game in 
Clichy-sous-Bois, the public-housing neighborhood north of Paris where they lived.1,2 Having 
stood too close to private property on their route home, Traoré, Benna, and ten additional boys 
fell victim to a police complaint, made supposedly out of concern for their safety. Officers 
arrived with dogs and rubber-ball pistols, and the teenagers began to run. Some hid behind cars; 
others made it home; some, the police caught on site.3 Traoré and Benna, however, experienced 
the worst fate: they hid in a transformer at an electrical substation and died by electrocution, 
killed instantly by over three thousand volts. Even worse, the police present failed to follow or 
search for the boys. Instead, help arrived hours later, when a concerned local placed a single 
emergency call. Bouna’s brother, Siyakha Traoré, remembers how cars burned that night “out of 
love for [the boys’] blood,” love for their entire community.4 But it wasn’t just these boys the 
community mourned. The events of October 27, 2005 became part of a pattern of police brutality 
against citizens of African origins. North African Malik Oussekine killed at a student 
demonstration in 1986; Seventeen-year-old Makomé M’Bowolé shot in the face during a police 
interrogation following a minor infraction in 1993; Four more dead after resisting possibly 
abusive identity checks in 2001.5 These examples give glimpses of the violence that 
                                                        
1 Maboula Soumahoro, “On the Test of the French Republic as Taken (and Failed),” Transition 98 (2008): 46, 
Project MUSE.   
2 Angelique Chrisafis, “The Trial that Could Lay Bare France’s Racial Divide,” The Guardian, March 15, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/15/trial-france-racial-divide.  
3 Soumahoro, “On the Test,” 46.  
4 Ibid., 48. 
5 Ibid., 45.  
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marginalized French youth experienced in their daily lives. Siyakha Traoré agrees that “had it 
not been for the cars burning, this would have been just another story in the news.”6 At first, the 
Clichy-sous-Bois community mourned quietly. Local youth held peaceful demonstrations. 
Within several days, however, some of the worst rioting in forty years erupted in suburban 
public-housing complexes throughout France. By week’s end, more than 9,000 vehicles were set 
ablaze, and dozens of public buildings had burned to the ground.7, 8,9 
 It would seem that Traoré and Benna’s deaths were the root cause of suburban 
riots in 2005 France. This is a reasonable assumption because in 2005, public-housing 
complexes were similar throughout the nation. I mean to say that Clichy-sous-Bois’s location 
and residents had a lot in common with those in other public-housing sites. As a neighborhood, 
Clichy-sous-Bois was filled with public-housing facilities; it had high concentrations of 
minorities and immigrants; it was located at the Northern edge of Paris. Likewise, other public-
housing complexes resided in the suburbs of dense cities and had large minority and immigrant 
populations. These similarities created a collective identity and experience that extended beyond 
the physical bounds of each banlieue, or suburban-housing neighborhood. As a result, Benna and 
Traoré’s deaths could have easily gone from a local to national tragedy. Minorities living in 
public-housing projects could have protested the boys’ devastating fate, as if to protest the 
demise of their own community members.10 Still, the tragedy did not directly result in riots.    
                                                        
6 Ibid., 48.   
7 Ibid., 49.   
8 Chrisafis, “The Trial that Could Lay Bare.”  
9 Angelique Chrisafis, “Nothing’s Changed: 10 years after French riots, banlieues remain in crisis,” The 
Guardian, October 22, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-years-after-
french-riots-banlieues-remain-in-crisis.  
10 Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 
75.  
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Instead, the French government’s callous, insensitive responses to Traoré and 
Benna’s deaths functioned as the more specific cause of upheaval in the banlieues. This is 
evident because mass-youth outbursts did not begin until after the French government blamed 
the boys for their own deaths, then lied about police actions in the public forum. These kinds of 
knee-jerk responses – which shifted blame from law enforcement to minority youth –revealed 
the uprisings not as acts of grief or senseless violence, but as a statement of political discontent.11 
Put more simply, suburban youth burned buildings and cars as a means to gain national attention: 
to insist that the status quo treatment of suburban communities could no longer stand. Mass riots 
thus spoke to a range of systemic problems and grievances concerning French public housing 
and its occupants.12,13  
French legislators responded with a range of reforms that addressed various 
banlieues conditions, as well as law enforcement outcomes, but one reform initiative did not 
fit the mold: a renewal of Zones d’Education Prioritaire.14 Enacted in 1981 and revived twice 
in the twentieth century, the Zones d’Education Prioritaire (ZEP) policy provisioned additional 
funds for secondary schools in designated priority zones. Administrators supposedly selected 
priority zones on the basis of a community’s average income bracket, prioritizing neighborhoods 
with the lowest average incomes and therefore greatest economic disadvantages. A first attempt 
at positive discrimination on the basis of economic status, ZEPs attempted to improve school 
outcomes for impoverished children by spending more on those with less. In theory, such a goal 
would promote égalité des chances, or the idea that all students deserve an equal opportunity for 
                                                        
11 Soumahoro. “On the Test,” 50.   
12 Chrisafis, “The Trial that Could Lay Bare.”  
13 Chrisafis, “Nothing’s Changed.” 
14 Caroline Hendrie, “In the Wake of Riots, France Refashions Priority Zones; Policy targets resources to the most 
disadvantaged middle schools,” Education Week, November 1, 2006, Gale Databases.  
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academic success. The implicit assumption is that academic success leads to later economic 
success and ultimately, a chance at vertical mobility among low-income children. According to 
the prior policy description, the only apparent connection between ZEPs and banlieues 
improvement is that most public housing projects have extremely low-income brackets. The riots 
of 2005, however, had little to do with the nature or conditions of public education. French 
Sociologist Maboula Soumahoro agrees that “suburban and student” are two disparate identifiers, 
which “appear to be…mutually exclusive.”15 The revival of ZEPs is even more confusing 
because in the twentieth-century, the program had many shortcomings. Research shows that it 
did not significantly improve student outcomes, nor did it ever receive an official line in the 
Ministry of Education’s budget.16, 17 These factors suggest that the program was both 
unsuccessful and unimportant. Furthermore, ZEPs had few effective enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure schools were making effective and impactful changes.18 As a result, the program received 
little to no national attention between its original enactment and its first, then second renewals.19 
Thus, we have a conundrum. In the twentieth-century, ZEPs attempted to help economically-
disadvantaged students achieve better academic outcomes with limited success. In the early 
twenty-first century, policymakers again revived ZEPs to help economically- and racially-
disadvantaged youth achieve better community outcomes in suburban public housing. This 
represents a drastic shift in the purpose of priority education and furthermore a perplexing 
revival of an apparently unsuccessful policy. It is even more drastic and perplexing because the 
                                                        
15 Soumahoro. “On the Test,” 53.   
16 Roland Bénabou, Francis Kramarz, and Corinne Prost, “The French zones d’éducation prioritaire: Much ado 
about nothing?,” Economics of Education Review 28 (2009): 346.  
17 Denis Maguain, “Discrimination positive: un bilan des experiences américaines et européennes,” Revue 
française d’économie 2, no. 21 (2006): 186.     
18 Viviane Isambert-Jamati, “Les choix éducatifs dans les zones prioritaires,” Revue française de sociologie 31, 
no. 1 (1990): 96.   
19 Bénabou et al., “The French zones d’éducation prioritaire,” 346.   
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most recent ZEP renewal occurred in 1997, only nine years prior to the policy’s post-millennial 
revamp. The sudden shift in the function of ZEPs and its generally unsuccessful twentieth-
century results led me to my project’s central questions. Why did the ZEP program change 
focus from improving student outcomes to improving banlieues outcomes? What about the 
program’s design and history allowed for it to shift goals with relative ease? Moreover, if it 
did not work, why did policymakers bring it back?       
Methods  
Time for a bit of honesty. I am not a French citizen. I have little previous public-policy 
research experience, and going into this project, I wanted to learn about educational inequities in 
France to make a comparison with the United States. I chose to focus on the ZEP program 
because it is a prime example of how French legislators combat issues of racial injustice 
somewhat differently than we do here (see chapter 4). In fact, as I discuss in chapter four, it is 
illegal under French constitutional law to distinguish citizens on the basis of race. This posed a 
difficult problem after the infamous 2005 riots, which brought issues of police brutality, “crime 
racialization,” and general racial discrimination to the fore of French political discourse.20 I 
wanted to understand how the ZEP program could help resolve these issues. Furthermore, I 
wanted to know if ZEPs really addressed racial tensions and inequities, or if they merely glossed 
over problems: creating a semblance of government action, while simultaneously steering clear 
of the controversial topics at hand. To find the answers I desired, I looked into educational 
policies that preceded ZEPs, then tried to get a sense of how the program evolved over time. I 
used this method because I wanted to prove that in 2006, priority education truly attempted to 
                                                        
20 Soumahoro, “On the Test,” 53.   
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improve outcomes for economically- and racially- disadvantaged children and communities, 
despite its prior economic-disparity focus and lack of success.  
My ultimate conclusion is twofold. First, French education policy increased focus on 
student economic and racial disparities throughout the twentieth-century, making the shift 
from ZEPs for improved student outcomes to ZEPs for improved banlieues outcomes an 
unsurprising transition. Second, although ZEPs were rather unsuccessful in the twentieth-
century, with each program revival, they focused more on children of the banlieues. In this 
way, ZEPs addressed banlieues issues – pumped money into suburban communities – 
without directly implicating racial status as a factor of socioeconomic disadvantage. I reach 
these two conclusions by examining how education policies evolved over the second half of the 
twentieth century. Between 1946 and 1999, education policies have provided increasing amounts 
of implicit and explicit aid for economically- and racially-disadvantaged students. 1946 is my 
starting year because it is the first of the Post-World War II Era. To clarify, whenever I use the 
term Post-War in this paper, I am referring to the Trentes Glorieuses, the period between 1945 
and 1975 in France. From 1946-1980, relevant education policies promoted the école unique, or 
idea that one school program could provide an identical education for all French students (see 
chapter 1). From 1981 – 1999, education programs began to promote égalité des chances, or 
equal opportunity for success across economic lines (see chapter 3). An analysis of programs, 
campaigns, and political discourse surrounding égalités des chances between 1981 and modern 
times further reveals that programs for positive discrimination often considered the needs of 
racially-disadvantaged youth in banlieues communities tacitly. Twentieth-century policymakers 
merely refused to admit this outright (see chapter 4). Thus, in 2006, the apparent shift from ZEPs 
for improved student outcomes to ZEPs for improved banlieues outcomes is not really a shift at 
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all. As a result, the policy’s actual success rates were less important than the very powerful idea 
that academic excellence could catalyze vertical mobility and improve life outcomes for youth 
“trapped” in the banlieues and acting out to prove it.21 Put another way, twentieth-century school 
aims underlie the 2006 ZEP revival. The policy’s “new” post-millennial focus is rather a more 
direct acknowledgement that ZEPs attempt to improve outcomes for children at an economic and 
racial disadvantage.  
Chapter 1 
In Pursuit of the École Unique: French Education Policy, 1946-1980 
In this chapter, I examine policy trends in French education between 1946 and 1980. I believe 
that these trends reveal an increasing commitment to an école-unique model for French schools. 
This model demonstrates policymakers’ expanded conception of formal equality in public 
education. I argue that such an expanded conception indirectly paved the way for policies 
promoting égalité des chances, or equal opportunity for academic success. 
 
Key Terms and Background – Formal Equality, Student Tracking, École Unique 
In the first half of the twentieth century, policies promoting formal equality tended 
to focus on creating like schools, rather than like student experiences. Formal equality refers 
to the idea that every child will receive the same schooling and in theory, the same education. 
Furthermore, formal equality represents one of the most basic tenets of French education, since 
France is historically famous for its insistence upon centrally-controlled schools, or rather 
schools that follow procedures and instructions defined at the national level.22 To understand the 
nature of French education policies promoting formal equality, consider the following examples. 
The Ministry of Education sets uniform curriculum, creates a common core, defines universal 
                                                        
21 Sébastian Compagnon, “Présidentielle: La ‘discrimination positive’ s’invite à nouveau dans le débat,” Le 
Parisien, March 13, 2017, http://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-la-discrimination-positive-
s-invite-a-nouveau-dans-le-debat-13-03-2017-6758190.php.  
22 Anne Corbett and Bob Moon, Education in France: Continuity and Change in the Mitterand Years, 1981-1995, 
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 45. 
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teacher directives, and evaluates children on the basis of standardized state tests. These policies 
uphold the principles of formal equality because they demonstrate a commitment – large or small 
– to an identical education across all schools, regardless of demographics or location. In the 
early to mid-twentieth century, a focus on creating identical schools did not necessarily entail 
an emphasis on identical student experiences. Put more simply, policies promoting formal 
equality attempted to provide each student with the same education through the creation of 
uniform schools. As for the individual child moving through the education system, his 
experience varied based upon the program into which he was “tracked.”  
While policies for formal equality attempted to create like schools, rigid tracking 
programs established opposing student pathways. Student tracking programs are designed to 
sort children into academic and vocational “tracks” depending on the academic proficiency they 
exhibit.23 In the first half of the twentieth century, French tracking programs began at the 
completion of primary grades; eleven-year olds took standardized ability tests to determine the 
remainder of their school careers. After receiving a single test score, students would move to 
secondary education on one of three tracks. Academic studies prepared youth for university; 
professional training prepared them for work in industrial management; and skills-based training 
functioned like trade school.24 Those on the academic track would finish their studies by taking 
the baccalauréat, or high school exit exam determining eligibility for universities. Others would 
enter the job market upon completion of their training, and as late as the 1950s, the majority of 
students did. In fact, throughout the decade only five percent of the total student body 
                                                        
23 Micheline Gioanni, “Problems in French Education,” Educational Horizons 34, no. 3 (Spring 1956): 197.  




matriculated to university.25 In a very real sense, elementary academic outcomes determined 
student futures, and thus rigid tracking systems limited formal equality both in schools and in 
broader society. Sociologist Katherine Anderson-Levitt agrees that the education system of Pre-
World War II France had a primary program for the masses and a secondary program for the 
elite.26 In other words, the primary program supported formal equality among students; the 
secondary program did not. The école-unique model attempted to resolve this ideological 
conflict. It worked create a singular school system for all.  
First discussed in the Post-War period, an école-unique model demonstrated an 
expanded conception of formal equality in that it promoted identical schooling for each 
child in both primary and secondary settings. To clarify, policies promoting the école-unique 
supported the idea that formal equality should have a democratic purpose, that there should be 
one comprehensive school system to serve every French child. As a policy goal, the école-unique 
model encompasses all the principles of formal equality; it merely expands upon them to provide 
a more identical education to students of any academic aptitude. Since France has always relied 
on student tracking as a means to promote realistic and gainful employment for graduating 
students, tracking programs did not disappear from the nation’s educational practice. Student 
tracking ensured that those less likely to succeed academically could still find employment after 
secondary school. The presence of tracking eliminates the possibility of identical schooling 
across all individuals. This is why any changes made to promote the école unique, particularly in 
the second half of the twentieth century, do not necessarily promote complete formal equality. 
Policymakers of this era (and today, honestly) had to balance a desire for more democratic 
                                                        
25 Gioanni, “Problems in Education,” 197.  
26 Katherine Anderson-Levitt, Régine Sirota, and Martine Mazurier, “Elementary Education in France,” The 
Elementary School Journal 92, no. 1 (1991):  80.  
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schools with a need to sustain economic stability and provide employment for all citizens. 
Nonetheless, the one-school-for-all model underpinned multiple education policies between 1946 
and 1980. These policies provided every student more years in school and more years dedicated 
to an academic education. In the following sub-section, I examine two case policy examples: the 
Plan Langevin-Wallon and the school reforms of 1963. Both reform programs illustrate how the 
ideological aims of the école unique manifested in mid- to late-twentieth-century school policies.  
Brief Policy Examples: Plan Langevin-Wallon (1946) and School Reforms of 1963 
While the Plan Langevin-Wallon did not eliminate student tracking programs, it did 
promote the école unique by providing compulsory education to all students through age 
eighteen. Compulsory education has existed in France since the 1880s, the Ferry laws insisting 
that schooling be “obligatory, secular, and free” for all.27 The amount of schooling varied, 
however, on the basis of a student’s school track. Children on management or vocational tracks 
left school at age fifteen to begin working. Children on the academic track instead continued 
their studies through age eighteen, preparing to take the baccalauréat and hopefully pursue a 
university education. The Plan Langevin-Wallon did not alter the tracking system in any way. 
Still, by allowing all children to attend secondary schools through age eighteen, the program 
made secondary-student experiences more similar. In a small way, it promoted formal equality 
on the individual-child level. This is a goal aligned with the aims of the école-unique, the one-
school-for-all model.   
The reforms of 1963 also upheld the principles of the école unique by eliminating 
student tracking in French middle schools. In the 1950s, administrators preserved tracking 
programs that began at the end of primary school. As a result, the average French child had a 
                                                        
27 Corbett and Moon, Education in France, 45.  
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high probability of no academic education past eleven years of age.28 In 1963, administrators 
moved ability examinations from the end of primary to the middle of secondary school, 
instituting compulsory academic education for all students between the ages of five and fifteen.29 
With this shift, elementary and middle schools served every child in the same way, providing a 
purely academic education before tracking began at age sixteen. The 1963 reforms thus worked 
to create a more unified school system, one that provided every child with a more or less 
identical school experience up until his last two years.  
Two brief examples may not constitute a policy trend; however, I argue that they 
demonstrate a commitment to the principles of the école-unique that did not exist in French 
education policy before 1946. The Plan L-W and the reforms of 1963 both demonstrate an 
expanded conception of formal equality, one that valued individual student experiences and 
gained momentum during the second half of the twentieth century. Sociologist Katherine 
Anderson-Levitt confirms that prior to World War II, there existed a dual-education system: 
primary programs for the masses, secondary programs for the elite. After World War II, new 
policies demonstrated a commitment to the one-school-for-all model.30 This model served as a 
guiding principle for French education policies and furthemore paved the way for programs 
promoting égalité des chances, equal opportunity for academic success.  
Moving Towards Égalité des Chances 
At first glance, it is unclear how policies promoting the école unique paved the way 
for those promoting égalité des chances (equal opportunity). Égalité des chances is the idea 
that every student, regardless of economic background, should have an equal opportunity for 
                                                        
28 Anderson-Levitt et al., “Elementary Education,” 86. 
29 Ibid., 81.  
30 Ibid., 80.  
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academic success. Let us first briefly consider how policies in support of one-school-for-all and 
equal opportunity are similar. In striving to produce one school for all, legislators prioritized 
formal equality among students for a democratic purpose. Policies for equal opportunity also 
prioritized students and promoted democratic aims. It is thus possible that the ideological 
foundations of the école unique did set the groundwork for policies that support equal 
opportunity. Still, the policies promoting the école-unique and those promoting égalité des 
chances produce opposing school models. The école unique aimed to create a school system that 
would serve all students in an identical – or at the very least similar – manner. Providing more 
years of academic and general education to all students would ideally eliminate barriers between 
groups, reduce elitism, and democratize the school system. Policies promoting égalité des 
chances did exactly the opposite by supporting a fair rather than equal distribution of educational 
resources. Policies for égalité des chances recognized that low-income or disadvantaged students 
needed more resources to succeed at the same rate as their more affluent or privileged peers. 
Thus, by encouraging equal opportunity, policymakers promoted dissimilar schooling among 
different subgroups of the population. The shift from policies promoting identical education to 
those providing specialized education for disadvantaged groups suggests a dramatic shift in the 
perceived purpose of public education. Policies promoting formal equality and the école unique 
aimed to create similar school experiences across all students. Policies promoting égalité des 
chances instead aimed to produce similar academic outcomes. A heightened emphasis on the 
possibility of academic success across all students demonstrated a new aim of public education: 
that the school system would protect the interests of every student and encourage equitable 
academic outcomes across class lines. Thus, the question remains. How did policies for the école 
unique pave the way for this new policy outcome?   
 17 
Policies promoting the école unique paved the way for policies promoting égalité des 
chances because once elementary and middle schools provided academic education, 
teachers, administrators, and bureaucrats noticed uneven school outcomes across class 
lines. These uneven outcomes helped reveal the inherent academic disadvantage that many 
twentieth-century, low-income children had to face. It is not a given that policymakers would 
respond to a notable student-outcome imbalance with an attempt to improve the academic 
outcomes of low-income children. Policymaking is complex, and a desire to aid disadvantaged 
youth in schools is likely the result of multiple social, political, economic, and moral factors. 
These factors are ultimately beyond the scope of this paper, as I am tracking trends in public 
education over the course of the twentieth-century, not the factors that led to them. For the 
purposes of this subsection, I focus on the imbalanced academic outcomes revealed as a result of 
1963 school reforms. The pre-1963 school system used standardized ability tests to select those 
who would continue on an academic path at the end of primary school. As for those who did not 
make the cut, their scores did not much matter after moving to a management or vocational track 
unconcerned with academic aptitude. In the post-1963 school system, all students were to 
continue an academic education, and thus, all students had to demonstrate sufficient academic 
proficiency in order to advance past primary school. Since the 1963 reforms eliminated 
standardized placement tests at the completion of primary grades, teachers became responsible 
for identifying fifth-grade students unequipped or unprepared to move to a secondary program. 
After the teacher identified such students, a committee led by the departmental inspector would 
decide each child’s fate. The options were twofold: either send the child onto secondary school 
or have the child repeat the fifth grade. Furthermore, students demonstrating insufficient 
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academic skills in the fifth grade had often already repeated an earlier year of primary school.31 
Having a child repeat a failed year of school, rather than allowing him to continue with his same-
age peers, is a practice known as grade retention.32 Grade retention was a very popular strategy 
among 1960s French teachers, but it was also correlated with poor academic outcomes among 
low-income students. Consider that in the 1970s, ninety-three percent of French students who 
repeated first grade were unable to qualify for the academic high school track. Consider further 
that eighty-four percent of the children of professionals and executives finished elementary 
school at an appropriate age, while only thirty-three percent of working-class children did the 
same.33 The former statistic indicates that grade retention may be a factor in poor academic 
outcomes. The latter confirms that grade retention occurred more frequently among working-
class children. In combination, these two statistics suggest that 1960s low-income children were 
more likely to have worse school outcomes than their more privileged peers. Speaking only to 
grade retention practices, these worse outcomes perhaps resulted from an emphasis on literacy 
skills that sometimes put low-income children at a disadvantage. The reasons that low-income 
children tend to have fewer literacy skills are beyond the scope of this paper. It is only important 
to understand that French first-grade teachers, in particular, did not want to pass students who 
had not yet learned to read. In fifth grade, retention was predicated upon a similar concern. 
Evaluation criteria most frequently relied on a student’s reading and grammar skills to determine 
eligibility for secondary-school programs.34 When it came to grade retention, a perhaps biased 
                                                        
31 Anderson-Levitt et al., “Elementary Education,” 81.  
32 Natalie Hoff, Reece L. Peterson, and Jenna Strawhun, “Grade Retention and Demotion: A Traditional 
Discipline Consequence,” Student Engagement (September, 2014): 1.  
33 Anderson-Levitt et al., “Elementary Education,” 81. 
34 Ibid.  
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emphasis on the mastery of standard French made it more difficult for low-income students to 
attain higher levels of education.  
1963 educational reforms promoting the école unique revealed an achievement gap 
between children from high- and low-income families. This is the gap that policies 
promoting égalité des chances intended to close. Although designed to eliminate barriers 
between groups, reduce elitism, and democratize the school system, 1963 educational reforms 
instead resulted in an unregulated and ultimately detrimental version of student tracking. Those 
with greater academic aptitude, as determined by their teachers, completed elementary school 
on-schedule. Those perceived as less capable or competent had to repeat one or more grades, 
which was in turn a factor leading to worse academic outcomes. Thus, a policy meant to promote 
the école unique, or similar education for all students, instead promoted more differentiation, 
often on the basis of a student’s class status. This is because teachers relied on grade retention 
more frequently among low-income students, rather than among their more privileged peers. 
Even without considering the effects of grade retention, 1963 school reforms forced teachers and 
departmental inspectors to examine the academic progress of each child more carefully. Policies 
promoting the école unique thus helped to reveal an achievement gap between society’s upper- 
and lower-class children. Policies for égalité des chances, or those promoting equal opportunity 
for academic success, worked to close this gap. As a result, I conclude that policies promoting 
the école unique paved the way for policies promoting égalités des chances, even if the former 
did not directly cause the latter.  
Chapter 2 
A Brief Digression: Immigration, Housing, and Education, 1946-1965 
In this chapter, I digress from my analysis of public education to examine some of the 
immigration and housing trends that forced French public schools to confront problems well 
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beyond their purview. In the Post-World War II Era, education policies worked to democratize 
public schools for the rich and the poor, the native French and ethnic-minorities. A large influx 
of immigrants complicated but did not preclude this aim. Meanwhile, government housing 
interventions often limited immigrant equality by encouraging or upholding the segregation and 
exclusion of immigrants from French public life.  
 
Immigrant Segregation and Housing Interventions: Bidonvilles and Brigades Z  
 
It was the Post-World War II Era that saw both the rise of democratic education 
and the segregation of immigrants into slums.35 As policies in public education supported the 
école unique model and aimed to provide formal equality across all students, the housing market 
tended to segregate and isolate immigrant families in neighborhoods with poor living conditions. 
In other words, as public education policies championed democracy and equality among 
immigrant children, housing trends seemed to do just the opposite among their parents.  I 
recognize that the French government could not control the housing market in the same way it 
controlled and designed public education. Nonetheless, government officials still had 
opportunities to intervene and alter immigrant housing patterns, particularly since most 
immigrants lived in government-subsidized public housing. Government interventions in the 
housing market did occur between 1946 and 1965; however, these interventions often did little to 
counteract poor public-housing conditions, nor the development of slums. The interventions did 
even less to prevent immigrants from living in communities without many local French citizens.  
The resultant isolation of immigrant families forced primary and secondary schools 
to shoulder many of the socio-political complications that segregated housing produced. 
Between the 1920s and 1960s, a high volume of immigrants came across French borders.36 Once 
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immigrants arrived in France, they were often segregated into selected neighborhoods, and the 
schools had to educate immigrant children in an environment with few, if any, native children. 
Educational polices between 1946 and 1980 demonstrated a commitment to the école unique, or 
the idea that one comprehensive school system should serve the children of all schools and 
communities. Thus, policies promoting the école-unique, in combination with a large influx of 
immigrants, meant that the public education system had to serve sizable cohorts of immigrant 
students in segregated school environments. In the following paragraphs, I chart how 
government housing interventions both encouraged and upheld this segregated housing system.  
Although the French government did not have direct control over housing, 
government housing interventions in the 1950s often encouraged immigrant segregation. In 
this paragraph, I discuss one government housing intervention in particular: bidonvilles public 
housing (as it relates to immigrant communities). Between the World Wars and shortly after 
World War II, an open-door immigration policy (among other factors) encouraged high volumes 
of immigrants to settle in France. Many bidonvilles – public-housing complexes at the periphery 
of large cities – were earmarked for immigrant families, ensuring that these families would have 
access to housing upon arrival. The French government encouraged immigrant families to live in 
the suburbs because the location was supposed help them transition into unfamiliar urban 
environments, while still providing access to city jobs. Allocating suburban public-housing to 
incoming immigrants also prevented city-housing crises.37 In light of the prior reasoning, 
encouraging immigrants to live in bidonvilles appears fair and in the best interest of new arrivals 
and other city residents. Scholar Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard, however, has a different 
perspective. She contends that encouraging immigrants to live in particular public-housing areas 
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created an intentional isolation, with migrants geographically segregated and expected to 
assimilate quietly amongst themselves.38 She further asserts that because France had an open-
door immigration policy, officials developed stringent methods of documentation and 
surveillance, a kind of de facto program for immigration control. Although Blanc-Chaléard does 
not specify bidonvilles housing as a mechanism of immigrant surveillance, her argument does 
support the conclusion that government interventions in immigrant housing often encouraged 
segregation.39 As immigrants continued to pour across French borders, immigrant housing 
became a prominent topic in political discourse. By 1954, in response to rapidly increasing 
numbers of new arrivals, the French government renamed bidonvilles “cites d’urgence:” 
temporary emergency housing complexes both inexpensive and readily available to immigrant 
families. Turning suburban public-housing into emergency housing served as a stopgap response, 
a temporary remedy to combat a dearth in available city housing. The unintended consequence of 
an apparently helpful intervention was a further relegation of immigrants to limited housing 
zones. Furthermore, these housing zones became so overcrowded that they soon turned into 
slums: shantytowns whose poor living conditions could only become worse as more immigrants 
arrived.40 Thus, while the interventions around immigrant housing often seemed to promote the 
best possible outcomes for immigrant families, they often encouraged immigrant segregation in 
particular areas, which in turn led to very poor living conditions for new arrivals. 
 Although the French government did not have direct control over housing, 
government housing interventions of the early 1960s often upheld immigrant segregation. 
In 1962, Algeria declared independence from France. Algerian refugees poured across French 
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borders, and officials began to view North African populations as “inassimilable” threats to local 
government and customs. Earmarking suburban public housing for immigrant families ensured 
that new arrivals had a place to live; however, it did not provide opportunities for immigrants to 
assimilate into French life and culture. As a result, the early 1960s saw continual flux in 
suburban-slum populations, as the government built new public housing complexes spread more 
evenly across French cities. At first glance, spreading public housing across the city seems to 
demonstrate a commitment to assimilation and immigrant aid, particularly since the new housing 
complexes had better living conditions.41 Unfortunately, some of the strategies intended to 
promote immigrant assimilation actually reinforced immigrant segregation. First, the French 
government did not move all immigrants out of bidonvilles and into more integrated public-
housing. Instead, officials selected particular populations on the basis of which immigrant groups 
they thought most likely to assimilate. These groups included immigrants of European descent 
and those from the French colonial empire. Other groups – often those from Sub-Saharan Africa 
– remained segregated in overcrowded bidonvilles.42 As to how the government got immigrants 
to leave their communities and homes, one would think this would not be difficult. It seems 
obvious that people would choose to leave an overcrowded shantytown. Nonetheless, since 
immigrant families did not always make the decision to leave their homes, the government 
sometimes resorted to force. If a family or community did not want to move, the government 
sometimes enlisted Brigades Z. A police task force created in 1961, Brigades Z attempted to 
frighten and thus force immigrant families to move from one public-housing area to another.43 
Although evidence of the actions of Brigades Z is difficult to find and even harder to 
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corroborate, a book by Blanc-Chaléard and an article from TV5 Monde suggest that in rare and 
extreme cases, the task force went so far as to burn or destroy immigrant homes in order catalyze 
internal migration.44, 45 For this reason Brigades Z is remembered as one of the greatest symbols 
of government violence against the people.46 I bring up Brigades Z because at first glance, it 
seems that 1960s housing interventions worked to provide options for immigrant families and 
promote assimilationist aims. While this may be true on some level, assimilationist goals were 
underpinned by practices that continued to isolate immigrants in new, slightly nicer communities 
and only if the government felt that the population had a good chance at assimilation. Many 
immigrants remained segregated in suburban public-housing with poor living conditions, and 
some were subjected to violence in order to force their migration.    
Stigmatization: The Unintended Consequence of Immigrant Segregation 
Whether intentional or unintentional, the consistent segregation of immigrant 
communities into bidonvilles public-housing created a stigma around ‘slum-bound 
immigrants.’ During the period between the First and Second World Wars, nationality of origin 
became an important marker of difference.47 In the Post-World War II Era, ethnicity remained an 
important marker of difference, even though France’s Fifth Republic Constitution technically 
bars any mention of ethnicity in the public sphere.48 In fact, into the late 1950s, many native 
Frenchmen considered bidonville neighborhoods to be dangerous, unsanitary, and maladapted to 
modern life. Researcher Minayo Nasiali contextualizes these kinds of ignorant biases in a 
discussion of the 1950s Peyssonel community, a banlieue neighborhood just outside Marseille. 
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Newspaper articles from the time period labeled the neighborhood “one of the most foreign in 
Marseille,…filled with Negro huts, Arab hovels, and Bohemian Caravans.”49 The articles took 
biases further still, proclaiming the area a center of crime and poverty plagued by “poor blacks, 
poor Arabs, poor gypsies,” and general derelicts.50 The Municipal Bureau of Hygiene conducted 
a 1955 study of the people living in Peyssonel. The study found that most heads of household 
had steady jobs, most families paid rent consistently, and most people were French or Italian in 
origin.51 These findings stand in stark contrast to media reports of a crime-infested, morally 
bankrupt slum swarmed with immigrants of ‘Third-World’ descent. The Peyssonel case 
highlights that stigmas surrounding bidonvilles often implicated North African, Gypsy, and 
Muslim immigrants without their actual presence needed. Media outlets assumed a high 
concentration of Third World immigrants on the basis of Peyssonel’s location and low-income 
bracket, further assuming the community crime-ridden, licentious, and filthy on the basis of the 
former assumption. In addition to media biases, the municipal study, itself, labeled immigrant 
nationalities inaccurately, as if to suggest a kind of bureaucratic indifference. ‘North African’ 
was a blanket term used to describe families from Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Senegal, 
countries that span the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Nasiali argues that such 
carelessness exemplifies how nationality categorizations had become racialized, meaning that 
stigmas surrounding the communities in bidonville public-housing actually centered around 
race.52  
Racialized stigmas exist in France to this day. Consider the following modern 
example: the insensitive government and media responses that led to mass youth riots in 
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2005. In addition to the government blaming Traoré and Benna for their own deaths, nearly 
every French news source misspelled Traoré and Benna’s names and confused the origins of 
Traoré’s family, claiming they were Malian instead of Mauritanian.53 Like in the Peyssonel 
municipal study, these kinds of errors suggest public indifference to specific ethnic affiliations, 
associating the boys more strongly with a foreign, racialized identity, than with a specific 
nationality. After the riots, racially insensitive, stigmatized commentary continued when 
politicians blamed the upheaval on polygamy or rap lyrics, rather than legitimate socio-political 
discontent. To me, this rhetoric feels reminiscent of ignorant and biased claims involving the 
Negro huts and general derelicts in Peyssonel. Such similarities in language over time suggests 
the persistence of stigmas crystalized across years of systemic housing segregation in suburban 
communities with high concentrations of foreigners and minorities.54  
Immigrant Housing Interventions: Predictive of 2005 Riots and a ZEP-Policy Response 
Every incident or condition that incited the 2005 riots spoke to a history of unjust 
housing practices. The government responded to these conditions with a renovation to 
public education because from 1946 onward, education promoted democracy and equality 
across all peoples.55 From the use of bidonvilles, a precursor to banlieue public housing, to the 
violence of Brigades Z, a precedent for police brutality, the housing interventions of the early-
Post-War Era set the stage for the 2005 riots long before they occurred. Benna and Traoré’s 
African and Muslim backgrounds, police brutality against minority youth, stigmatized 
government responses, and the racial composition of Clichy-sous-Bois, itself. All these 
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conditions spoke to banlieue neighborhood demographics, stigmas surrounding minority 
communities, and violence against minority youth. In other words, all these conditions spoke to a 
history of unjust housing practices, not academic inequities. Despite the apparent incongruity 
between problems associated with housing and solutions found in educational inclusion, 2006 
administrators nonetheless made a decision in line with the housing and education trends 
cemented in the aftermath of World War II. It was the Post-War Era that championed equality 
among students across socioeconomic lines, while fundamentally refuting it among low-income 
families of recent immigrant descent. Between 1946 and 1965, the école unique served every 
immigrant children, regardless of his ethnic background or economic status. Housing 
interventions engaged in the same time period often encouraged or upheld the restriction and 
exclusion of immigrant populations. In this way, the French government burdened the education 
system, asking it to promote and protect democratic aims in a society more diverse and 
divided than ever before. Beginning in the 1940s, education programs took on the all the 
problems and complexities of a segregated housing system. The public education system 
continues to shoulder these complexities today.  
Chapter 3 
In Pursuit of Égalité des Chances: French Education Policy, 1981 – 1999 
Returning to the development of French public education across the twentieth-century, this 
chapter documents the rise and implementation of education policies promoting égalité des 
chances. Égalité des chances (equal chance) is the idea that every student should have an equal 
opportunity academic for success, regardless of his parent’s economic status. The rise of these 
policies in twentieth-century France demonstrates a growing commitment to helping students at 
an economic disadvantage achieve vertical mobility through academic success.  
 
Égalité des Chances and Social-Mobility Schools – Background from the 1940s  
Let’s define the term social-mobility school and determine how it relates to égalités 
des chances. Defined as the upward or downward shifts of individuals, families, and groups 
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from one class position to another, social, or rather vertical, mobility in schools implies the likely 
upward movement of disadvantaged children due to effective curriculum and other in-school 
supports. This is relevant to égalités des chances because among French legislators, academic 
success was construed as a strong predictor of economic success. If low-income children had an 
equal chance at academic achievement, then any child, regardless of economic background, 
could achieve economic stability and middle-or-upper class status on the basis of academic 
merit. For low-income children, this would allow for vertical mobility.  
Now, let’s briefly discuss when ‘social-mobility’ first developed into a school aim in 
the United States and in France. This chapter mainly focuses on policies promoting égalité des 
chances enacted between 1981 and 1999. To understand where these policies came from, 
however, I want to take a moment to explore the history of social-mobility schools in France and 
the United States. I begin this subsection with United States’ schools because the social-
mobility-school reforms enacted in France were often modelled on or influenced by those of the 
United States. As far as I know, the idea of social-mobility schools first appeared in the Western 
education policy arena in the 1940’s United States. In fact, Sociologists W. Lloyd Warner, 
Robert J. Havinghurst, and Marvin B. Loeb wrote a 1944 book entitled Who Shall Be Educated?, 
in which the three authors described the public school as an “elevator in a hardening social 
structure.” More literally, the mid-1940s U.S. school system had become a primary milieu for 
social mobility, whereas in the nineteenth century, the family and the church had a more 
exclusive influence in this role.56 Warner et al. listed five theoretical responsibilities for schools 
in an era of social mobility. Responsibilities included teaching tolerance to children across 
socioeconomic lines, helping individuals to realize new societal ideals, and selecting and training 
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children for social mobility.57 The idea of ‘selecting children for social mobility’ suggests a 
system predicated on student ability tracking; however, this is unsurprising for the 1940s. In 
French education, too, the idea that schools could and should promote social mobility first arose 
in the mid-1940s under the Plan Langevin-Wallon. In practice, the Plan L-W opened an upper-
secondary program to all students and made strides towards the école unique, or formal equality 
across all students. The plan, however, also established broader pedagogical aims that set the 
stage for democratized schooling in Post-War France. More specifically, the plan established 
three principles that aligned with the ideals of social-mobility schools. First, it labeled the public 
school an organization for justice and emancipation, requiring that all primary and secondary 
programs meet the academic needs of all students. Second, it insisted upon continual elevation of 
French culture and civic pride in the collective consciousness of the student body.58 Third, and 
often overlooked, it encouraged schools to foster a sense of global responsibility through the 
incorporation of everyday realities into school curriculum and culture.59 By highlighting justice 
and emancipation, academic needs, all students, and everyday realities, the plan’s ideological 
motifs encased the basic values championed by a social-mobility school model. This is because 
social-mobility schools emphasize the right of every child to receive an equal and just education 
in the hopes that he or she can use this education to succeed academically and in a broader social 
context. It is important to note that the principles espoused in the Plan L-W are similar to the 
theoretical responsibilities established by Warner et al. just two years prior. This similarity 
suggests a commitment to social-mobility schools that transcended national borders. As to how 
and why these ideas began to spread in the 1940s, it may have had something to do with the 
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nature of the Post-World War II Era. The specific reasons for such a dissemination and sharing 
of ideas, however, go beyond the scope of my paper.  
The Plan L-W promoted social-mobility schools in the abstract but did not attempt 
to enforce new educational principles. More effective enforcement did not occur until the 
late-1970s and early-1980s. Under the Plan L-W, there was a gap between the desire to produce 
social-mobility schools and the actual enacted reforms. This is perhaps one reason that local 
administrators often used the plan to demand additional funds for a variety of expenses, rather 
than guide the provision of just and emancipatory education programs.60 Thus, the Plan 
Langevin-Wallon set noble ideological aims for education but did not provide the immediate 
infrastructure changes necessary to achieve them. Unfortunately, the necessary infrastructure 
changes needed to create social mobility through schools did not arise in French policy until the 
late 1970s. During this decade, the idea for Priority Education Zones (ZEPs), a program 
promoting égalité des chances for the purpose of vertical mobility, began to garner support 
among French teacher unions.61 President Mitterand and the Socialist party grandfathered the 
idea for ZEPs into their political platform. In fact, Mitterand’s 1980 campaign rhetoric expressed 
the future president’s desire to provide égalité des chances (equal chance) for economically-
disadvantaged students. In his opinion, the policies of prior conservative regimes favored the 
privileged classes to the intentional detriment of working-class students. It was these students 
who most often faced academic failure and thus matriculated to tracking programs that barred 
access to higher education.62 Mitterand’s statements suggest that he hoped to provide more 
academic opportunities to low-income students so that they might succeed at the same rate as 
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their more privileged peers. This promotion of égalité des chances fulfilled the idealistic aims of 
earlier French education policies and encouraged the idea that social mobility could start in 
French primary and secondary schools.  
A Brief Digression: Social-Mobility Schools as an Old Idea in Western Thought 
Although the concept of social-mobility schools did not appear in policy until the 
mid-twentieth century, it is nonetheless a very old idea in Western thought. I want to 
provide some context on the educational framework that grounds social-mobility schools in order 
to illustrate that Post-World War II school philosophies were not as new, nor as revolutionary, as 
they may seem. I could have selected many different works, as the ideals behind social-mobility 
schools are quite widespread in Western education scholarship. I chose to examine the works of 
Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Dewey partially because of their name recognition for 
those outside the field of public education. More than that, I selected these scholars because they 
published texts in three separate countries across three different centuries that nonetheless 
encourage schools to serve all children as a collective body, as individuals, and as equals who 
can rise through education.  
In order for schools to promote social mobility, they must commit to providing an 
effective education for every child. In Plato’s case, effective meant useful to the republic, or 
rather the state. The first Western scholar known to discuss compulsory education in writing, 
Plato insisted that education should begin in youth and continue throughout one’s life.63 He 
argued for early onset because to his mind, if an education system functioned well then so, too, 
would every other matter of state. In this way, education (and not policy) served as the true 
foundation of government because when education was in order, the collective could “correct 
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deficiencies and supply the power of self-government” without outside intervention.64 Thus, 
Plato argued that education was crucial for socialization and for the maintenance of society. I 
further contend that Plato’s argument grounds the concept of social-mobility schools. In order for 
a school system to function as a “social elevator” for all children, it must serve every child. In 
order for legislators to promote schools for social mobility, they must first believe that schools 
maintain society and promote desired societal aims.  
According to Rousseau, public schools could serve as a tool for social mobility, or 
even a tool for transgression of the current societal milieu. An outsider throughout his life, 
Rousseau’s writings tended to emanate an intense social marginality, relying on personal 
experience, as much as broader social, historical, and political considerations.65 This peculiar 
voice came through strongly in Emile, Rousseau’s controversial commentary on the individual 
child’s sufferings under the dominating auspices of the French school system. Arguing that such 
a system threatened “the whole welfare of humanity,” Rousseau asserted that no man should be 
educated only for his societal station. Since life was unpredictable, and the future was 
unknowable, the station of one’s parents was not necessarily predictive of future life prospects.66, 
67 In a society that allows for social mobility, in a globalized world in which people move, laws 
change, and fortune comes and goes, future scholars had to be nurtured: they had to understand 
how to live in any context, how to revel in and profit from life.68 Rousseau’s hopeful view 
invited each child to rise through education and asked that the system educate each individual 
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so that they could lead any sort of life. Such an argument, in its expansive view of the role and 
power of education, grounds the ideas behind social-mobility schools.  
John Dewey, in his 1919 book Democracy and Education further supported the 
principles of social-mobility schools because education that transcended class boundaries 
also created a more stable democratic state. Dewey, like the two prior scholars, understood 
education as a necessary social function, one that in 1919 still varied in quality based on the 
social and economic position of a group. In a democracy, or society that encouraged 
improvement through change, educational models and practices needed to differ from those of 
other school systems. This is because democracies had to produce more equitable school 
outcomes in order to act in line with pronounced societal principles.69 A society with strict and 
immovable class distinctions educated for the purpose of class restriction and isolation. 
Democratic societies rather encouraged contact between social classes and inspired collective 
goals across class lines. Ideal democratic societies educated students as future citizens and 
voters. Thus, Dewey championed the connection between the citizen and the republic, the child 
and the school system. According to Dewey, democracies placed higher stakes on effective 
universal education and national community cohesion.70  With these ideas in mind, one can see 
how Dewey’s argument grounds the ideas behind social mobility schools. Since democratic 
societies required that all students receive a good education in order to participate in the 
democratic system, schools must help students feel both connected to their national identities and 
welcome to participate in democratic institutions. If social-mobility schools were to truly work, 
they would result in all members of society feeling more equal after having experienced equal 
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levels of academic success, or at the very least, equal opportunity for academic success as a 
result of a fairer division of resources.   
Back to 1980s France: The Zone d’Éducation Prioritaire Program 
Before delving into the design and implementation of ZEPs, I want to briefly explore 
why a program for égalité des chances became a priority in 1980s France. It is first 
important to note that the ZEP program was not necessarily French in nature or conception. In 
fact, France was not first among Western nations to enact a priority education program in the 
Post-War Era. Instead, the idea took root in United States education in the mid-1960s, then in 
Great Britain in the early 1970s. Title I in the United States provided federal aid to schools with 
large numbers of low-income students; Great Britain’s “Education Priority Areas” literally gave 
the French ZEP policy its name. 71, 72 Both U.S. and British programs reprioritized the education 
of their most impoverished students by spending more on schools in neighborhoods with the 
lowest income brackets. As to the purpose this reprioritization served, the United States 
understood added funding as a means to “help ensure that all children [met] challenging state 
academic standards.”73 Emphasis on the academic success of ‘all children’ is the idea of égalité 
des chances, or the idea that every student should have an equal opportunity to succeed in public 
schools. The similarities between Title X, Education Priority Areas, and the French ZEP suggest 
that in the 1981, France followed the lead of two similar nations, rather than innovating on its 
own. In fact, local teacher unions – which were the first group to support ZEPs in France – took 
their ideas directly from the British Education-Priority-Area policy.74 Socialist presidential 
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candidate François Mitterand grandfathered the idea for ZEPs into his campaign platform and 
enacted the policy within his first year in office. Thus, it seems that the 1980s became the era of 
égalité des chances policies due to a combination of factors. Determining them all would require 
extensive social and policy research, but briefly, it seems that some of the biggest factors were 
educational trends in the U.S. and Great Britian, Mitterand and the Socialist Party, the desires 
and concerns of French teachers, and the growing conception of public schools as a promoter and 
protector of society’s democratic and egalitarian aims.     
Now, let’s discuss what the ZEP did and how it worked. In terms of how the program 
operated, the 1981 ZEP designated certain geographical regions as priority zones and thereby 
drew administrators’ attention to the schools and students facing the gravest economic 
disadvantages.75 Administrators supposedly selected priority zones on the basis of a 
community’s average income bracket, prioritizing neighborhoods with the lowest average 
incomes and therefore greatest economic disadvantages. A first attempt at positive discrimination 
on the basis of economic status, ZEPs attempted to improve school outcomes for impoverished 
children by spending more on those with less. More commonly referred to as affirmative action, 
positive discrimination entails the implementation of positive measures that benefit 
disadvantaged people or groups.76 In the case of ZEPs, positive discrimination provided more 
economic resources to benefit low-income children in schools, or rather to improve their 
academic outcomes. The ZEP program began as temporary because the Ministry of Education 
hoped resource increases would catalyze community partnerships, teaching strategies, and 
enrichment programs that could continue once the ZEP designation had expired. At first a rather 
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vague classification, a priority zone designation did not at first specify any desired in-school 
changes.77 Schools in ZEP-designated regions were instead asked to determine what kinds of 
supports This is in part because the national Ministry of Education wanted to provide aid on the 
basis of what local teachers, administrators, and parents deemed most important to their 
particular schools. In this way, ZEPs promoted a diffusion of responsibility to those who best 
understood what local children would need to succeed, providing schools with greater funding so 
that they could catalyze changes and greater autonomy so that they could see them  
through.78, 79, 80  
Let’s examine the reforms that individual ZEP schools implemented most 
frequently. Since the program had no universal criteria, one can only uncover a clear set of 
goals by examining initial program evaluations. French sociologist Vivienne Isambert-Jamati did 
just that in a 1990 journal article, in which she combed 1980s ZEP school reports and divided 
enacted reforms into three respective categories. The categories included improvements to 
teaching and curriculum, improvements to in-school communities, and improvements to 
relationships between schools and local families, or the community at-large.81 The teaching and 
curricular category housed some of the most concrete national reforms, while the community 
relationships category was considered the most important but least engaged of the three. Most 
schools implemented at least some changes across all three categories. In terms of teaching and 
curricular improvements, the national government allocated specific resources to pay for more 
teachers or teaching aides and to raise teacher salaries in hopes of attracting higher-caliber staff. 
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The government also paid overtime so that educators could work additional hours with students 
in need of extra help.82 These types of changes ensured that children understood course material 
as the year progressed, rather than forcing students to repeat a school year had they not mastered 
the material by the end.83 Other reforms under this category tended to place a strong emphasis on 
language, reading, and dual language instruction. Some schools even provided individualized 
academic aid, tutoring sections, or programs like GAPP (groupe d’aide psycho-pédagogique), an 
in-school therapy group for children from troubled homes.84 In terms of in-school community 
improvements, tactics included a range of practices generally aimed at community-building and 
beautification. Schools often reported creating more club options, art workshops, or social 
events, adding decoration to facilities, improving cafeteria food, and forming a student advisory 
board.85 The most important and most radical category – school-community relationships – 
held high status for two main reasons. First, policymakers believed that students socially 
engaged with their school communities and curricula would feel motivated to complete 
assignments. Second, through the intermediation of community programs, parents would 
hopefully feel implicated in their children’s education and understand it as an important aspect of 
French socialization.86 Despite its importance, changes in this category were nonetheless rare; 
they included the creation of cultural and community centers, libraries, and neighborhood 
bulletins. Some efforts were as simple as walks through the surrounding environment or school 
participation in community holidays and festivals.87 Never explicitly stated, these types of 
reforms had an underlying implication: that the ZEP program hoped to aid children of diverse 
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cultural and ethnic backgrounds, as much as it supported those from low-income homes. 
Isambert-Jamati reinforces this point, highlighting the government’s desire to engage local 
cultural and academic resources as part of a localized curriculum and daily in-school 
experience.88  
The ZEP’s push for locally-determined student and community programs was not 
universally well-received. With an explicit emphasis on students of low-economic status, the 
ZEP championed student achievement in a way no policy had done before. Enacted in pursuit of 
égalité des chances, ZEPs placed emphasis on equalizing student outcomes across class lines. 
This proved controversial in that a commitment to equal opportunities for academic success 
entailed increasing local autonomy to aid low-income students. This was controversial because it 
decentralized French school control from all national to slightly more local levels and because it 
allowed school curriculum and programs to vary between communities. French education is 
historically famous for its insistence upon centrally controlled schools. During certain eras, the 
national government has gone so far as to standardize details from desired student outcomes to 
hours spent per day on math or language instruction.89 In fact, the French have often viewed 
nationally mandated curriculum in primary and secondary schools crucial to the success of 
French students, who all take identical ability tests and high school exit exams. Journalist 
Maurice T. Maschino, philosopher Jean-Claude Milner, and education scholar Marie-Claude 
Bartholy were some of the most vocal 1980s critics, publishing and distributing pamphlets, even 
books, that warned against a curriculum set and designed by individual schools. In these 
writings, Maschino, Milner, and Bartholy, maintained a more conservative view of French 
education, conservative referring to the traditional practice of setting national curriculum and 
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academic programs for all. The conservative camp supported a return to more stringent methods 
of teaching, as subscribers believed students should passively receive information presented in 
formal ways.90 Under this philosophy, state-mandated education served a single purpose: to 
transfer the knowledge and morals of one generation to the next. Sociologist Isambert-Jamati 
labels this view of education antiquated, rooted in nostalgia for a French lycée, or upper 
secondary school, that no longer existed.91  
Overall, the ZEP policy promoted schools for social mobility in a way that 
emphasized the importance of effective education in low-income communities for the sake 
of égalité des chances. In 1981, ZEP programs catered to several rights of French students that 
the Ministry of Education had long-respected. These included the right of each child to education 
and training, the goal to educate towards responsible citizenship, and the goal to promote a 
capacity for adaption, creativity, and effective contribution to French society.92 According to the 
Ministry of Education, the ZEP was successful in that it gave students from disadvantaged areas 
additional resources and attention from age two onward. It further required that schools neglect 
no student, even if that student was unlikely to take the baccalauréat and would instead move to 
a vocational pathway. The program failed in that it did not do enough to promote universal 
change across all disadvantaged regions, resulting in lingering achievement gaps that 
policymakers hoped to continue shrinking in the future. The analysis presented in the Education 
Framework Act led to the first ZEP renewal, a renovation in 1990 meant to improve education 
amongst all disadvantaged communities and groups.93, 94 I will return to this renewal later in this 
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chapter. For now, I want to discuss the 1980s policy trend that promoted égalité des chances in 
education. 
Other 1980s French Policies Promoting Égalité des Chances 
Although ZEPs are perhaps the most famous example of a policy for the purpose of 
social mobility, President Mitterand’s 1980s administration made further efforts to 
promote égalité des chances across French schools. Consider the eradication of Activités 
d’Eveil as an example of a policy decision made for the purpose of promoting equal opportunity 
for success. Designed under a Montessori model for teaching history, geography, and social 
studies, Activités d’Eveil curriculum gave teachers and students the freedom to explore topics as 
they chose, take field trips, and expand perspectives through individual enrichment. From the 
late 1970s through early 1980s, politicians and educators of many political affiliations worried 
about the quality of history education.95 Conservative political groups were the first to complain, 
concerned that the more freeform curriculum would lack important cultural and nationalistic 
undertones. By the late 1970s, however, multiple interested parties had voiced concerns. 
President of the Association of Professors of History and Geography Jean Peyrot even claimed 
that 1970s students were “historically illiterate” and possessed completely different historical 
referents as compared to their over-forty peers. In 1983, President Mitterand responded to 
multitudinous concerns with a promise to reform the teaching of history and philosophy so as to 
avoid further “loss of collective memory in the young generation.”96 Acting on this promise, 
Minister of Education Alain Savary asked a history professor at a prominent Parisian university 
to lead a study on the effectiveness, or rather ineffectiveness, of the Activités d’Eveil program. 
Both the professor and Savary were dismayed by the results of the study, which concluded that 
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the policy had produced a significant dearth in children’s history knowledge upon entering 
collège, the French equivalent for middle school.97 Even more disappointing, the study revealed 
that sixty-nine percent of teachers did not take trips to nearby historical sites, while twenty-three 
percent of elementary school educators did not bother teaching history at all. The program’s 
vague directives had left instructors unequipped to create strategies for student success in history 
programs.98 A problem typical of France’s highly centralized system, the Ministry of Education 
set guidelines for teachers, while departmental inspectors, tasked with policy enforcement, often 
left educators to interpret curriculum as they chose.99 In this way, the government did not bother 
to ensure that teachers understood how to effectively implement new pedagogies.100 
Standardized curriculum, let alone overarching pedagogical goals, thus created a paradoxical 
autonomy among teachers, “for reforms imposed from the top [were] reinterpreted, if not 
subverted, as they [moved] through the channels from Paris to the classroom.”101 In the case of 
Activités d’Eveil, since the majority of teachers ignored or simply did not understand policy 
goals, its influence on pedagogy and instruction proved limited, if not adverse.102  
In response to the program’s apparent failure, the ministry of education switched 
from a Montessori model to a more structured, chronological program called Back-to-
Basics, thereby protecting the needs of disadvantaged students.103 Under Back-to-Basics, 
national bureaucrats refashioned history programs in a way that provided highly specific 
directives for educators to follow. These new directives insisted upon seventy hours of history 
instruction per year, dividing the hours between time spent on individual projects and time spent 
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on more traditional-style lectures and recitations. Chronology of events was a specific priority, 
particularly at the middle-school level, and policymakers created seven chronological units that 
included a list of key concepts, vocabulary, dates, events, and persons to know or memorize.104 
As to why this dearth in historical knowledge was such a concern, the answer is multifaceted. On 
an obvious level, a large dearth in any body of student knowledge is unfavorable. Still, 
policymakers’ deeper arguments for such specific reforms stemmed from a desire to protect the 
educational opportunities of low-income students. In the early years of his presidency, Mitterand 
was the first socialist leader to preside over a socialist-controlled parliament.105 With Back-to-
Basics, however, his ministry of education relied on paradoxically conservative reforms. 
‘Conservative’ here refers to the traditional practice of setting strict curriculum and academic 
programs for all, as well as the idea that students should receive information presented in formal 
lecture and not through more creative, individualized pathways.106, 107 Such a conservative 
pedagogical model engaged an opposite strategy to that engaged by ZEPs, as the latter program 
decentralized curriculum so that teachers could innovate on the basis of their communities’ 
needs. In the case of Activités d’Eveil, the freeform nature of the program model most impacted 
students from disadvantaged homes, since – even as history curriculum became more fluid – 
state tests had not changed, and in France, passing tests is key to a successful academic future. 
Children from upper-class backgrounds received the French cultural and historical information 
they needed at home, but those from working-class or immigrant backgrounds relied 
predominantly on schools as their vehicle for future advancement.108 The fact that both 
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conservative and progressive ideologies underlie 1986 Back-To-Basics and 1981 ZEP reforms 
suggests an overarching commitment to student equity, or rather schools for social mobility, that 
transcended partisan preferences. Furthermore, the idea that working-class children needed 
schools for future advancement feels at least tangentially tied to 2006 education ministry official 
Pierre Polivka’s assertion: “the republic and the school are linked in France.”109 This is true 
particularly among students of low socioeconomic status, for if the schools do not serve them 
equitably, they cannot go on to serve French society in their future careers and lives.  
While ZEP and Back-To-Basics programs prioritized the education of 
socioeconomically-disadvantaged students, other 1980s reforms sought to promote parity 
among individual students in a broader sense. A condition foundational to the French one-
school-for-all model, education funding is fully centralized at the national level. To understand 
this concept, consider that in 2015, France spent twenty-one percent of its national budget on 
education, as compared to 2.6 percent spent at the United States federal level.110, 111 The French 
government even subsidizes private education, in which over ninety-five percent of students 
receive Catholic schooling.112 Such schooling runs directly counter to the French mandate for 
Laïcité, or the strict separation of church and state.113 Every government observing the 1951 
“contract of association,” however, has placed a higher value on centralization of school funding 
than on upholding secular principles.114 Minister of Education Alain Savary hoped to reduce this 
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ideological contradiction by closing administrative and curricular gaps without infringing upon 
religious autonomy. His plan, entitled the Savary Bill, angered secularist school supporters, so 
they requested the assistance of the National Assembly. Unfortunately, proposed amendments 
were then unacceptable to the Catholic education camp. A full-day protest ensued, as one million 
private school supporters marched the 1984 Parisian summer streets. The Savary Bill had failed. 
He and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy resigned in disgrace, their efforts for greater unity and 
equality across French schools ultimately unsuccessful in this case.115  
ZEPs and Égalité des Chances in 1990s and the Twenty-First Century 
With the creation and implementation of 1981 ZEPs, the French government 
produced a more effective model for égalité des chances. Still, three subsequent renovations 
– in 1990, 1997, and 2006 – reveal that France is still working to promote education that 
gives all children the opportunity to succeed. The 1990 ZEP restoration clarified the role of 
ZEPs as a program to raise success rates on standardized tests, particularly among disadvantaged 
students. 1997 reforms focused on ZEP efficiency, pushing for greater teacher stability; 
activities centered on the basics: speaking, reading, and writing; and increased school willingness 
to work within the neighborhood community and ZEP model. 2006 renovations diversified the 
program through the addition of Réseaux d’Education Prioritaire, or rather a new designation to 
identify communities with the greatest demonstrated need.116 With each ensuing revival of 
priority education, the national government attempted to perfect the schools for social mobility 
model, adapting ZEPs to accommodate new student needs or newly identified obstacles.  
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Moving beyond 2006 policy goals, égalité des chances programs first enacted in the 
1980s have greatly impacted French school outcomes and policy decisions today. In a 2014 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, forty percent of 
French people aged twenty-five to thirty-four had achieved a higher level of education than their 
parents. This exceeds the average increase in educational achievement amongst all participating 
OECD nations.117 France also increased investment in primary, secondary, and higher education 
institutions between 2005 and 2011, spending fifteen percent more per capita at the university 
level and three percent more per capita at the primary and secondary levels.118 Although the 
connection is correlational and not causal, these increases perhaps signify a sustained 
commitment to improved public education following the social disturbances of 2005, particularly 
at the higher-education level. Further speaking to this commitment, it is interesting to note that 
the 2016 OECD report on education mentions that in 2013, France spent a higher proportion of 
its Gross National Product on public education than the OECD average.119 A study by Oxford 
University Economists Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina expanded these results, explaining 
that between 1870 and 1993, percentages of GNP’s spent on public education have increased 
from zero to above nine percent in nations like Norway, France, and the United Kingdom, among 
others.120 In France, in particular, policymakers spent approximately 5.4 percent of the GNP on 
education in 1993. In 2013, the number remains similar, at around 5.5 percent.121 Although this 
expenditure did not much change over the course of ten years, the commitment to equitable 
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public education in France is clear, as in 2015, the nation had a ninety-nine percent literacy 
rate.122 Furthermore, unlike the teachers of the Activité d’Eveil program, who were often primary 
school instructors with little to no university education on history instruction, today’s teachers 
need a master’s degree to even consider entering the classroom.123 In 2013, the French Ministry 
of Education created Ecoles Supérieures du Professorat et de l’Education (ESPEs), or masters 
programs dedicated specifically to primary and secondary teacher and staff training. The 
programs combine theoretical work with hands-on experience and require even nursery school 
educators to receive a master’s degree before they can certifiably teach.124, 125 Out of all OECD 
nations, France is one of only four who stipulates this requirement in teacher training.126 Thus, 
even after 2006, the idea of schools for social mobility – of equitable education across all bounds 
– has only increased and is a clear goal of the French educational system to this day.   
Chapter 4 
The Unsuccessful ZEP in Suburban Public Housing 
In this chapter, I first establish that the ZEP was unsuccessful in producing improved academic 
outcomes among low-income students. I then examine how between 1981 and today, the ZEP 
actually promoted égalité des chances among students at both an economic and racial 
disadvantage. Legislators merely did not speak to the second category outright because of the 
controversial nature of discussing race in the public sphere. 
 
The Unsuccessful ZEP 
 
Although the ZEP program set a precedent for future legislation, its initial attempts 
at positive discrimination were rather unsuccessful. ZEPs have become a staple policy for the 
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promotion of equitable education, but a scathing report by Economists Roland Bénabou, Francis 
Kramarz, and Corinne Prost labels the 1981 and 1990 programs a waste of government funds and 
a proliferation of boastful rhetoric. These researchers focused on quantitative effectiveness, first 
noticing that ZEPs have never been listed on France’s national education budget.127 Economist 
Denis Maguain cites different findings, explaining that while there has never been an official 
document stating as such, in practice, the French government has spent an average of 0.7 percent 
of the annual education budget on ZEPs. This is an undeniably small amount, particularly when 
one considers that by 2006, ZEPs had expanded to serve one out of every five French students.128 
By the late 1990s, 700,000 primary school and 400,000 middle school students – eleven and 
fifteen percent of respective populations – attended ZEP-designated schools. To provide a sense 
of the amount spent on such schools, consider that in 1998, the ZEP program received a total of 
400 million euros above baseline school allocations. As for the original program, a quarter of 
funds paid teacher bonuses, while the rest either paid teacher overtime or provided funds so that 
schools could hire more personnel to decrease class sizes. There was little emphasis on, nor was 
there any money dedicated to, non-wage related financial concerns.129 After studying the 
program for student cohorts in 1982, 1989, and 1990, the economists found that a ZEP title 
resulted in no statistically significant improvements to justify expenditures on bonuses, nor 
overtime for an enlarged teaching staff. Despite a pay increase meant to attract higher-caliber 
educators, teachers in ZEPs tended to have less experience and hold fewer degrees than the 
average French teacher.130 In terms of hours spent in the classroom, increases were slow and 
modest. Hours of instruction increased by approximately one percent per year for students of the 
                                                        
127 Bénabou et al., “The French zones d’éducation prioritaire,” 345.   
128 Maguain, “Discrimination positive,” 186.  
129 Bénabou et al., “The French zones d’éducation prioritaire,” 347.  
130 Ibid., 351.  
 48 
1980s and early 1990s programs. In terms of decreasing class sizes due to additional teaching 
staff, ZEP-designated schools experienced an average class reduction of 0.2 students per class 
per year. This translates into 2 students lost over the course of ten years. Furthermore, the 
number of teachers present in ZEP schools did not increase much more than the number in any 
traditional school environment. When the number did increase above the average, it was because 
schools that received a ZEP designation often lost between four and six entering students per 
year due to a stigmatizing label, one that warned families of a likely low-performing school.131 A 
result of ultimately unhelpful modifications, student outcomes did not much change in light of a 
ZEP title. In fact, when comparing student success rates on the baccalauréat before and after a 
school adopted a ZEP label, the variation is not statistically significant.132 This perhaps suggests 
why secondary school students demonstrated throughout France in 1990, nine years after the first 
iteration of ZEP-status schools. In the protests, students demanded an increase in school funding 
for better security, facilities, and still smaller class sizes.133 In light of Bénabou et al.’s findings 
on ZEP ineffectiveness, these demands are unsurprising.  
Quantitative statistics on the failures of the initial ZEP program are problematic on 
their own. Education scholar Vivienne Isambert-Jamati’s qualitative contributions to the 
research literature do not improve the program’s overall impression. Using reports from 
educational rectories tasked with data collection from each ZEP zone coordinator, Isambert-
Jamati examines 1980s primary sources to complete her 1990 program review.134 The reports 
highlighted reforms that fell under three categories which corresponded to overarching program 
goals: actions to improve teaching and curriculum, actions to improve in-school community, and 
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collaborative actions to improve school-community relationships.135 Of the 350 geographic areas 
originally declared ZEPs, schools implemented at least some changes across the board, although 
most favored reforms relating to curriculum and in-school community building. Furthermore, 
since schools relied on the mobilization of funds from the national government, the limited 
impact of increased funding explained by Bénabou et al. further restricted the program’s overall 
qualitative effectiveness.136 Just as with Activités d’Eveil, inability to monitor each school’s true 
activities made it difficult to accurately evaluate program success. While schools did provide 
reports each year and had ZEP coordinators charged with overseeing the district, it was hard to 
determine exaggerations of truth, as well as which programs already existed and only received 
more national support under the new policy’s guiding hand.137 In a Parisian district visited by 
social researchers, administrators of the ZEP program came from outside the community. 
Detached from local schools, already overworked and overwhelmed, these administrators did not 
much care about the program’s successful implementation. Reviewing school reports was just 
another affair on their plates. In addition, the ZEP coordinator for this district was a local school 
leader. Although more closely connected to the region, he still explained that his school would 
always come first.138 Thus, the ZEP policy represented new ideals but had little assurance of 
enforcement, despite the fact that the data in Isambert-Jamati’s reports does look promising as to 
the qualitative success of the early 1990s program.  
The original ZEP program had yet more shortcomings. Although meant to provide 
more to those with less, the original ZEP had no selection criteria to ensure that it benefitted 
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those who most needed aid.139 As a result, 1980s schools had the option to opt out of the 
designation, which the Communist party initially encouraged their mayors to do, since they saw 
the label as stigmatizing.140 Furthermore, priority zones were often placed in regions loyal to the 
party of the president, prime minister, or minister of education. As an example, in the 1981 
program, twenty-nine percent of middle schools received a ZEP designation in the Nièvre region. 
This was a rural region, not necessarily poor and not of high immigrant composition; however, it 
was one of President Mitterand’s electoral strongholds, and through this program he provided the 
community with additional school funds and special academic status.141 Nearly twenty years 
later, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin still complained of the issue, explaining that thirty-nine 
percent of middle school students in Nièvre went to schools with a ZEP designation, while only 
twenty-nine percent of students from the poor public housing project Seine-Saint-Denis did the 
same. This housing project resides within Clichy-sous-Bois, where the 2005 riots began after the 
deaths of local teenagers Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna.142 The subsequent renovations of 
priority education worked to ensure that such inequities could not persist. Falling in line with this 
aim, an entire website now exists to promote the history, goals, and strategies behind effective 
priority education.143 Thus, despite initial failures, the government now relies heavily on ZEPs to 
promote equity across all schools and to support the needs of disadvantaged populations. As to 
why this has occurred, consider the following connections between ZEPs, aid for those with 
implicitly-intersectional identities, and outbursts among banlieue youth that began in 1981 but 
continue to this day.  
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A Present and Implicit Emphasis on Race 
In order to discuss how ZEPs grant tacit aid on a racial-inequity basis, it must be 
established that the program’s emphasis on race is both present and implicit. Keep in mind 
that race must remain implicit because France’s Fifth Republic Constitution does not recognize 
the difference between citizens on the basis of gender, race, or religion. An examination of the 
modern controversy surrounding positive discrimination programs provides an opportunity to see 
the implicit use of race in the discussion of banlieues communities. I focus on examples from the 
early twenty-first century because they are easier to find than those from the twentieth-century, 
which often allude to race in even more clandestine ways. It is important to note that although 
positive discrimination began in ZEPs, it has since proliferated across several policy initiatives in 
French education and employment fields. To understand how the racial component is implicit, 
first consider the following claim from a 2008 LeMonde article: although positive discrimination 
polices vary greatly, one thing they all have in common is that the ‘discrimination’ is never 
based on ethnicity or race. Rather, policymakers focus on less controversial labels, aiding people 
of low-economic status, those from disadvantaged neighborhoods, or victims of undefined social 
inequalities.144 Current President Emmanuel Macron used similarly vague language to discuss 
the people positive discrimination programs attempt to aid. During his campaign, Macron 
championed increasing positive discrimination through the modern version of the ZEP program, 
pumping still greater resources into disadvantaged neighborhoods. He claimed that certain 
neighborhoods are trapped, the people stuck in their own communities because French society at-
large has not allowed them to succeed. In his rhetoric on disadvantaged citizens, Macron, as 
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would be expected, did not overtly recognize the race nor ethnicity in his description of positive 
discrimination programs. Nevertheless, vague adjectives like ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘trapped’ call 
to mind journalist Angelique Chrisafis’s 2015 statement on the youth of Clichy-sous-Bois, youth 
who are “stuck in dismal suburbs [and] marginalized [or] jobless because of their address, skin 
color, or…parents’ immigrant origins.”145 The similarity of the two statements suggest that 
Macron and Chrisafis are referencing the same socioeconomically and racially disadvantaged 
community. The former is merely unwilling or unable to express such an idea in an overt 
manner.  
Although vague terminology often suggests an implicit understanding of racial 
inequities across French society, official reports that have motivated ZEP renewals often 
highlight predominantly economic disparity in student success rates. The best example of 
this trend occurred prior to the most recent ZEP restoration in 2014, when an OECD report 
proclaimed France the number one country in which parental job title was a determining factor in 
student achievement.146 Put another way, even in 2013, the achievement gaps first noticed in the 
1960s still existed more in France than in any of the other thirty-four OECD nations. As a 
reference, included nations range from Japan to Mexico, Chile to Belgium, and Australia, among 
others.147 The ZEP revival of 2014 was a direct response to a report that revealed exclusively 
economic inequities, thereby suggesting that positive discrimination programs sometimes do 
function to rectify only economic and not implicitly racial disparities.  
                                                        
145 Chrisafis, “Nothing’s Changed.” 
146 Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale, “La Lutte Contre Les Inégalités Scolaires,” Gouvernement.fr, May 15, 
2017, http://www.gouvernement.fr/action/la-lutte-contre-les-inegalites-scolaires.  
147 “List of OECD Member Countries – Ratification Convention on the OECD,” OECD, accessed April 10, 2018, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm.  
 53 
To understand that the racial component is nonetheless present, consider the 
following policy and political-discourse examples. The most outright instance of race and 
ethnicity present in a program for positive discrimination, the #LesCompétencesDabord 
campaign, raised awareness around unfair racial biases in the hiring of new personnel. The 2016 
national campaign explained how companies hiring practices often discriminated against those 
with non-French names or origins. Of two equally qualified candidates, a person with a non-
French name or origin on average had to send out four times as many résumés as a person of 
French background in order to gain employment.148 In response to this glaringly unfair hiring 
practice, the French government created a national awareness campaign that directly addressed 
discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race and ethnicity. This is somewhat surprising 
decision, since the Fifth Republic Constitution does not recognize the difference between 
citizens on the basis of gender, race, or religion. Thus, #LesCompétencesDabord provides an 
excellent example of the fact that the French government can and does recognize ethnic 
discrimination as a factor that limits equity and opportunity among people of color. Similar to the 
#LesCompétencesDabord campaign – and unlike her opponent Emmanual Macron – right-wing 
populist Front National Candidate Marine Le Pen discussed positive discrimination and its racial 
basis openly. Claiming in a news broadcast that she did not support positive discrimination, 
Marine Le Pen denounced the ZEP and other similar initiatives as racist and contrary to the 
constitutional perspective that France is “one and indivisible.” She went on to explain that 
instituting any positive discrimination program on the basis of ethnicity is instituting a policy of 
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difference on the basis of origin or race.149 Le Pen refused to shy away from the reality that no 
other politician would express, and she is still one of the few to do so.  
Now that we have established that race does play a factor in positive discrimination 
programs, consider that implicit racial inequities have always colored the nature and 
purpose of ZEPs. In terms of the ZEP, such a purpose is not evident on the surface level. 
Rather, the presence of certain enacted reforms, such as dual-language programs, provide a 
glimpse at the original program’s goal to aid not only those of low-economic status, but of non-
French descent.150 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin clarified this idea in the mid-1990s, when he 
complained that the students of Seine-Saint-Denis, the predominantly immigrant and minority 
public housing project of Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna, deserved more ZEP-status schools than 
other neighborhoods or communities.151 An emphasis on the particularly high need of Seine-
Saint-Denis continued in the 2006 ZEP renewal, considering 2005 police brutality and riots 
occurred there. It continued once again in the 2014 ZEP renewal, Seine-Saint-Denis being the 
only department in which nine specific emergency measures were taken to ensure student 
competence and immediate academic improvement.152  
Such a persistent focus on this particular public housing project sheds light on what 
the term ‘disadvantaged neighborhood’ actually means. Although the twenty-three-page 
comprehensive region report refuses to speak to the racial and ethnic breakdown of citizens, 
Seine-Saint-Denis is the French region with the highest concentration of foreigners in the 
nation.153, 154 Since France denies the validity of a racial lens through which to examine its 
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populations, comprehensive statistics are difficult to find. Professor Alain G. Hargreaves 
nonetheless reveals that foreign children account for nineteen percent of the population, while 
children living in immigrant-run households account for thirty-eight percent. Assuming that 
some of the children who grew up in these immigrant households now have homes of their own, 
the number of foreigners increases. Furthermore, many French nationals from external territories 
live in Seine-Saint-Denis, providing yet more people of semi-foreign descent not counted among 
immigrant families.155 The resultant demographic is a population of foreigners in much higher 
numbers than Hargreaves could calculate. Thus, the fact that such a neighborhood is a prime 
target for ZEP reforms suggests a very present program focus on foreign-born citizens, on 
immigrants, and likely on people of color, despite general government refusal to admit as much.  
The conditions surrounding each ZEP renewal further illustrate that ZEP programs 
have always focused on students in suburban public housing, often students who are both 
low-income and of non-French descent. This is because prior to every iteration of the ZEP 
policy, there has been an outbreak of violence in the banlieue. This not only suggests that the 
ZEP is the government’s favorite stopgap solution, but also that it is the best the government can 
do in response to outbreaks of public violence, without drawing into question broader issues of 
police brutality and general discrimination in relation to race and ethnicity. Sociologist Maurice 
Lemoine agrees that after every outburst of suburban violence, the French government has taken 
emergency measures, followed by an enactment of ad hoc solutions that are reactionary, rather 
than seeking to enact positive, persistent, and systemic change.156 While most sources attribute 
the initial creation of ZEPs to Mitterand’s efforts and to local or more global policy trends (see 
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chapter 3), Researcher Fabien Jobard discusses the ZEP as a policy response to the 1981 public 
disturbances in and around the Minguettes Estates, a public housing complex just east of 
Lyon.157 Colloquially referred to as the ‘Hot Summer,’ disturbances in Minguettes involved 
youth from the Estates entering the main city, stealing high-performance cars, and taking them 
on joyrides near their homes. Teenagers often engaged car chases with other youth or local 
police, and once they were done, they burned the cars in the streets. By summer’s end, 250 cars 
had gone up in flames, and these types of actions became emblematic of the modern banlieues 
crisis in France, a term inclusive of 2005 rioting and protest, among other incidents involving 
rash action on the part of local youth and often brutal police responses.158 Attempting to 
capitalize on the Hot Summer demonstrations, immigrant youth in surrounding areas mobilized 
support to pursue beneficial policy changes, just as the new Socialist regime came to power. 
Efforts were unfortunately disorganized; little progress was made, but one year later, ZEP 
reforms went into effect in the banlieues and beyond.159 The ZEP relaunch of 1997 came in the 
aftermath of similar banlieues conditions, after a series of riots had plagued an overall turbulent 
decade in French suburban public housing. Beginning in the Mas du Terreau Project, a three-
night confrontation between local youth and police broke out, as youth looted and burned cars, 
engaged acts of civil disobedience. These actions became a prototype that persisted throughout 
the 1990s, producing ten to fifteen conflicts in the first half of the century alone.160 Just before 
the ZEP renewal, riots broke out in Dammarie-lès-Lys, after police shot and killed a local 
teenage boy.161 According to the Education Prioritaire website, the ZEP renewal was more 
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directly a response to a report from the Ministry of Education’s inspector general, entitled “The 
Determinants of Academic Success in the ZEP.” It was the first ZEP program to institute 
differing levels of aid depending on school need amount of perceived student disadvantage. 162  
Although still using vague terminology, the 1997 report still produced a ZEP program more open 
to establishing greater distinction among communities and therefore students. It is an interesting 
correlation that such a change occurred in the wake of police brutality and youth rioting in 
France’s predominantly immigrant and minority public housing projects. In 2005, the link 
between police brutality, riots, and an ensuing ZEP revival strengthened yet again. A report was 
ordered in 2006 from the inspector general and was entitled “The Contribution of Priority 
Education to Equality of Opportunity.” Shortly after, the government revamped the entire 
program, adding new distinctions and categories that allowed many more schools to participate 
in the program and certain schools to receive more funds.163 Again, this evidence is correlational, 
but it seems that the report came as a response to the rioting and in turn determined the kinds of 
changes that should be made to the ZEP program to improve student outcomes. If this is the case 
in 2006, one can assume that it was perhaps also the case prior to the 1997 ZEP renewal. It is 
important to note that other policies were leveraged in response to increasing violence, rioting, 
and police brutality in French suburban housing projects. Still, the ZEP has been a staple policy 
to combat issues of violence and rioting for a long time, one reason being the fact that the French 
refuse to view such violence as an issue of discrimination and rather invest in education to act as 
a future pre-emptive measure. 
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The Problems with an Implicit-Racial Lens 
When policies for equitable education have attempted to implicitly aid minorities 
and bar discrimination, such policies have only incited so much change in the implicit 
domain. A 2009 LeFigaro article highlights this dilemma by describing perspectives of French 
people of color on positive discrimination programs. In the article, Vice-President of France’s 
Conseil des associations noires, a lobby for several black associations, made a statement begging 
the French government to more openly recognize racial discrimination in public life and policy. 
He proclaimed the overt, official recognition of racial and ethnic disparity crucial to tackling 
pervasive issues of discrimination and inequity.164 The government’s new Commissioner of 
Diversity and Equality of Opportunities agreed, claiming France in a state of apartheid and 
insisting that measures be put into place to encourage the promotion of blacks and Arabs into 
business and politics.   
The Commissioner was right to be concerned, for policies that have attempted to 
help disenfranchised minorities indirectly have often experienced somewhat limited success 
in that arena. Take as an example presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron’s campaign 
argument that the government should provide 15,000 euros to every company. This money 
would be set aside for the salaries of people coming from disadvantaged neighborhoods. A 
policy the French originally enacted in 1996 under Prime Minister Alain Juppé, it was rather 
unsuccessful at producing real, measurable results for people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.165 This is true of other positive discrimination programs, too, now more commonly 
known as programs for “Égalité Des Chances.”  
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Programs for equal opportunity have begun to spread in particular among 
institutions for higher education, often those most competitive and selective. The Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration, or France’s most elite public policy graduate program, has created a 
preparatory class specifically for students of disadvantaged neighborhoods, although the 
definition of ‘disadvantaged’ and who this policy actually serves is unclear. All French students 
take preparatory courses to apply for this type of school; however, this class – like the ZEP 
program – recognizes the particular needs of disadvantaged students, helping them gain the 
resources they need to apply successfully to the ENA. Although the ENA website makes it very 
clear this program exists, the actual success from year to year is unclear, as are the history of the 
program and its purpose, since the website refuses to characterize exactly which community it 
serves.166 SciencesPo, another competitive French university, has instituted a similar program. 
Any French student can apply to this school via competitive examinations, and those with the 
highest scores are admitted. Recognizing that this tends to limit access among students of low 
socioeconomic status or non-French descent, SciencesPo created a concours, or competitive 
exam, specifically for students from ZEP schools. This program has had moderate success, 
welcoming four hundred students from ZEP-designated regions between 2001 and 2008.167, 168 
The SciencesPo program doubled its enrolment of disadvantaged students, but a low starting 
number has resulted in a still small population of students from disadvantaged homes in this top-
tier university.169  
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The attempts to use positive discrimination in secondary schools and other public 
institutions have had overall limited, if any, success. An essay by Maurice Lemoine written in 
the mid-1990s crystalizes this point with his disheartening review of teacher experiences in the 
banlieue, or public housing projects surrounding Paris, Marseille, and other large French 
cities.170 Just before the second renewal of the ZEP program, Lemoine discusses the multitude 
and magnitude of problems facing public schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Typical class 
sizes are close to thirty students; predominantly French teachers work with pupils of all 
ethnicities and cultural backgrounds; students are not connected to the cultural and financial 
world beyond their banlieue; and children range in age from eleven to seventeen, as a result of 
repeated failure and resultant student retention.171 Lemoine mentions the ZEP policy, first 
instituted about eight years prior to the writing of his essay, in a manner similar to that of 
Bénabou et al. In a section entitled, “A Lot of Money but Great Waste,” Lemoine notes how 
ZEPs were designed to provide greater support for students and teachers alike, as well as 
increase community-school relationships. In practice, however, the programs have thrown 
money at the problems faced by banlieue schools without providing concrete solutions and 
methods to achieve change. Although in some areas, the programs have been successful, 
criticisms highlight that money is available, but this does not necessarily provide for the needs of 
the students, nor the school. Alain Demarche, French secondary school teacher, furthers this 
claim, explaining that the magnitude of the bureaucracy itself is a hindrance to progress. If a 
school wants to institute a new program or class, they must make a plan, attend meetings, get 
principal approval, get regional approval from the general inspector, and final approval from the 
Ministry in Paris before any money can come back to the school. This process takes anywhere 
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from three to six months.172 This constitutes a third to more than half of a school year. In 
addition to such bureaucratic obstacles to innovation and change, geography teacher Marie Ploux 
notes that ZEP designations have given the impression of change, of improvement, and in some 
places academic outcomes have improved. This does not trickle down, however, directly or even 
indirectly to the mind sets and work habits of secondary students. As she explains, “the pupils’ 
relationship with the work hasn’t changed.”173 Overall, in the mid-1990s, teachers in ZEP 
schools expressed feelings of isolation and exhaustion, as already minimal supports deteriorated, 
understaffing increased, and the chasm between government messages and everyday realities 
continued to grow.174 All this leads Lemoine to question whether education reform is enough 
when the overall infrastructure of suburban housing projects has not changed or been addressed 
by policymakers.175 An article from the French Observatoire des Inégalités, or Observatory of 
Inequality, agrees on this point, claiming that schools and teachers alone cannot bear the burden 
of equalizing all opportunities for students of disadvantaged backgrounds.176 The fact that issues 
impacting disadvantaged neighborhoods have persisted through four ZEP renewals between 
1990 and 2014 only reinforces this claim. The article brings up issues ranging from hiring equity, 
to the increasing employer insistence on a college education or higher among employees, the rise 
in poverty, to a lack of cultural capital possessed by families already disenfranchised by lacking 
academic and economic prospects. The article goes further still, claiming that the ZEP program 
limits resources only to the students most destitute and most underserved, while leaving many 
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still without the proper resources they need to successfully pursue a higher education or other 
career path.177   
Conclusion 
It is thus a combination of positive and negative factors that led policymakers to reenact 
the ZEP program following the police brutality and riots of 2005. Positive discrimination is 
controversial in France, but not nearly as controversial as it would be to admit fault for 
discrimination on the basis of race. By reviving a public education reform in 2006 policy, French 
officials missed another opportunity to address and discuss the stigmatization and discrimination 
present in their society, which stems from a once intentional separation of immigrants, 
particularly those of African descent, from the French public at-large.   
From one perspective, the ZEP policy expanded the mission of previous education 
policies that promoted the école unique through nationally standardized curriculum, funding, and 
state tests. The ZEP program and Back-to-Basics took it a step further, even, pushing for equal 
opportunities for success among students of low socio-economic and (implicitly) inferior racial 
status. The ZEP program marked the beginning of rhetoric the promoted positive discrimination. 
This rhetoric has risen and fallen in importance among policymakers over the years. And despite 
a sometimes-lacking discussion of racial and gender inequity, overt recognition of disparity in 
the caliber of schools across neighborhoods was and is a huge step in the right direction. ZEPs 
were the first program to work to shrink that disparity by granting suburban schools the right to 
tailor curriculum and add resources that benefited their student demographic. The national 
government reallocated funds so that schools with a priority-zone designation could achieve this 
goal, which more broadly represented a goal of providing equal opportunity for academic and 
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career achievement through more equitable schooling practices. Ultimately, the ZEP program 
marked national recognition of inequities among French students, as well as a desire to do 
something about the inequities experienced specifically by society’s most disadvantaged 
members.178  
From another perspective, an increased investment in public education was an investment 
in community buy-in: if the French government could instill in children and parents a collective 
French identity – a desire to participate in mainstream society through improved and effective 
schools – then the pathway to individual student success could double as a pathway to 
assimilation and suburban-neighborhood improvement. In other words, if the ZEP worked, not 
only individual students, but entire communities could improve their quality of life through an 
alignment with French values and an understanding of the importance of education. There is an 
insistence on assimilation, a desire to use education as not only a tool for individual uplift but 
also community integration. From a Platonian perspective, this is merely a means to use 
education and not policy as the key to establishing and maintaining a functional society.179 ZEPs 
both protected and championed the individual and citizen supported by Rousseau and Dewey, 
while supporting the societal framework supported by Plato. According to 2006 Ministry 
Official, if the education system fell apart, so, too, would France’s Republic.180 Thus, school 
reforms became a reasonable solution to banlieues community problems. In a modern context, 
however, and because race and immigration status were never directly mentioned following a 
situation that was relevant to a history of anti-immigrant sentiment and violence in France, these 
seemingly helpful ideas instead partially overshadow what I believe to be a more relevant 
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conversation. Scholar Maboula Soumahoro agrees that a revival of ZEPs does not address the 
complexity of the issues at hand in an open and public manner.181 
With these ideas in mind, it is easy to understand why the French government returned to 
the ZEP policy in 2006 in light of youth riot and protest: the ZEP was designed to help youth of 
marginalized identities, adolescents who were poor and often of recent immigrant descent. These 
are exactly the students who died, who rioted, who felt trapped in dismal suburbs.182 It is equally 
easy to understand Soumahoro’s reaction, particularly since she is a scholar of color, of African 
descent, and of French origins. As always, the new ZEP program did not directly address the fact 
that many students living in impoverished suburban neighborhoods were of immigrant, often 
African origins. Scholars have since intimated this fact without clearly implicating race, the 
language often more focused on vague and undefined terms, such as low economic status or 
general disadvantage as leading causes for disparities in educational opportunity. 
Perhaps, when it came to the question of immigrants, of bidonvilles, of the poor and rich, 
the French government chose education to serve not only as a tool for assimilation but a tool to 
equalize opportunity. This is not necessarily a surprising choice, as making education a tool for 
uplift and assimilation did not require the actual integration of housing across income, racial, and 
religious lines. It is important to remember that although schools may have improved, public 
housing projects like Clichy-Sous-Bois still exist, police brutality in such neighborhoods still 
exists, general public opinion towards slums and the people in them has not much changed in 
seventy years, as was evidenced by the similarity of media responses in both the Peyssonel and 
2005 riot cases.183 In 2005, the goal of uplift through policies for education stood in the place of 
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uplift through an honest and committed attempt at integration. This sentiment captures the legacy 
of democratic education and undemocratic housing strategies among immigrant populations. In 
other words, much work has been done, and much work remains. For things to truly change – for 
the school system to promote truly equal chance – I think the French need to place an open 
emphasis and enact policies to fulfill the needs of economically- and racially-disadvantaged 
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